The Virtual Historian

Le Devoir, Saturday October 17, 1970

Editorial

The War Measures Act: Three questions

Pulling out from the archives an old document that has not been used in the last 20 years, the Canadian government has decided yesterday to hit Québec terrorists by invoking the extraordinary powers conferred by the War Measures Act (RSC, 1952, chapter 288).

As you can see on page 7 (not included), this Act confers so much power to the federal government that it has never been invoked in peace time Canadian politics. Given the nature and gravity of this decision, it is necessary to ask some fundamental questions.

The first question goes without saying: Was Ottawa's decision rigorously justified in the circumstances?

Yesterday, Mr. Trudeau justified his decision to use these unusual powers by making reference to the letters from Mr. Bourassa, Mr. Drapeau and M. Saulnier, which apprehend an insurrection in Montréal and all over Québec.

It is possible that Québec and Montréal authorities have at their disposal new evidence on the current situation not available to the press. But nothing in the course of events so far suggested the necessity of such a decision.

Mr. Bourassa, in his public speech of Sunday, seemed to opt for negotiation in the Cross-Laporte crisis. In the following three days, nothing suggested a different course of action. Thursday afternoon, Mr. Bourassa asked for the assistance of the army. Here, again, he was very careful to mention the circumscribed nature of this decision.

What happened in the minds of Mr. Bourassa and his colleagues on Thursday afternoon to opt for the hard line? From an outside perspective, the only additional elements were the meetings held by college and university professors and students, and the strike incitements from Vallières, Gagnon, Chartrand, and Lemieux. If these meetings had been a major popular success, we would understand the current reaction. The contagious "popularization" of the FLQ would have resolutely endanger existing legitimacy and created a risk of civil war. Yet, nothing of this happened. On the contrary, the artists who tried to cheat democracy for their cause died not successfully misled the people.

Until Thursday, the situation suggested that the government of Mr. Bourassa would negotiate the current Cross-Laporte crisis with limited assistance of the army. What reasons pushed Mr. Bourassa to suddenly opt for rigidity? What motives led him to jump in Mr. Trudeau's open arms? These questions are on the lips of many. It is extremely important for Mr. Bourassa to provide us with answers as many people now believe he has purposely lied to the public, suggesting over the last week that he favoured a soft approach to the crisis.

In moments of crisis, the most important virtue for a government is transparency. Without it, there is no democratic link between the people and the government. Yet, the events of the last days have seriously shaken the government of Mr. Bourassa and the confidence of the public in his government.

The current situation was, for Mr. Bourassa and his government, a unique opportunity not only to stop the so-called apprehended insurrection by all means, but to reaffirm the responsibility of the State of Québec.

Facing a unique situation in North America, the government of Mr. Bourassa should have taught us respect for life. This government should have also found a special formula to reintegrate in mainstream democratic society thousands of people who have particular social and political convictions yet unacceptable methods.

This double challenge was difficult. It would have required the government to oppose the deployment of a more impressive force. It would have also required pushing to the side chauvinistic attitudes and recognizing a new movement, which may use unacceptable means, but no longer is avoidable in Québec. This was the third way; the way to a more generous and, in the long run, more realistic opportunities.

Abandoning his initial and vague intentions, Mr. Bourassa has preferred, in the end, to opt for the power of Ottawa. By requesting the War Measures Act, the Québec premier has, in principle, subordinated his own government to the one of Mr. Trudeau. He revealed to the rest of the country the old memory of Ottawa as the true national government and Québec as a tumultuous province in the federation.

This attitude is contrary to the developments of the last 10 years. More problematic, it can even provide a blueprint for what might happen next in other areas. In the middle of a crisis, Mr. Bourassa has given up power under pressure. He will have a hard time fighting this negative image even among his federal colleagues and fellow citizens.

As for Mr. Trudeau, he might initially suppress the FLQ. But he will fail to prohibit some of the ideas that his government might even contribute to diffuse. His actions will not put a term to the "final question;" a question that will ultimately be resolved in Québec. As a former theorist always suspicious of established authorities, Mr. Trudeau is now a military guardian. It is vain to find in the documents baring his signature any reference to what he once characterized as the virtues of federalism: rationality, free choice, respect and equality. Mr. Trudeau will claim he had no choice, others will maintain he looked for it.

The perpetrators of the acts of October 5 and 10, as well as their collaborators, are responsible for the proclamation of the War Measures Act and the suspension of civil liberties in Québec. Their disrespect for the rule of law and human rights justifies the legal proscription of the FLQ.

Yet, it is unfortunate that the War Measures Act was proclaimed because its scope goes well beyond the current situation. Equally problematic is the use of the Act as if the worst could happen. That being said, it is necessary for a democracy to reaffirm its right to self-defense and to suppress those who imperil freedom and life.

Claude Ryan